5 post etichettati con "The Zenzic Chronicles"

During the final consolidation sprint for v0.7.0, we ran four AI agents against Zenzic's own documentation site. They were instructed to find everything wrong with it.

The siege is over. All four bypass vectors are closed. 1,195 tests pass. The Bastion holds.

Four bypass vectors. Four real findings. All closed.

Most documentation builds operate on an implicit contract with their input: the content is trusted because the contributors are trusted. It's a reasonable assumption for a wiki. It is an indefensible posture for a security-conscious CI pipeline.

Zenzic was built to invalidate that assumption — to treat documentation the way a compiler treats source: as input that must be analyzed, validated, and potentially rejected before it reaches production.

If your documentation is part of your CI pipeline, it's part of your attack surface. Zenzic is designed for CI pipelines that handle untrusted docs, open-source projects with external contributors, and teams running multiple doc engines side by side.

Every CI/CD pipeline has a security perimeter. Developers run static analysis on source code. They scan container images for CVEs. They audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities. They enforce secrets detection in commit hooks.

And then they push raw, unvalidated Markdown files directly into a documentation build — and call it shipped.

This is not a theoretical gap. It is the default posture of almost every engineering team I've observed. I built Zenzic to prove it — and fix it.